F. KEITH BALL, United States Magistrate Judge.
This case comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Springleaf Financial Services, Inc. ("Springleaf") [13] and the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Henry Hall [16]. Having considered the motions, supporting memoranda, responses, and supplemental memoranda and having held a hearing on the motions, the Court finds that Springleaf's summary judgment motion should be granted, and Plaintiff's summary judgment motion should be denied.
The parties do not dispute the facts of this matter. Plaintiff Henry Hall serves as a captain in the Mississippi Army National Guard. Pursuant to ORDERS A-08-213933, dated August 8, 2012, the United States Army ordered Capt. Hall, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d),
On June 24, 2013, Capt. Hall obtained a consumer loan in the amount of $5,600.24 from Springleaf, bearing an annual percentage rate of 34.37%. Subsequently, Capt. Hall requested that Springleaf reduce the interest rate on his loan to 6% pursuant to the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527(a)(1). [13-1] at 24, 29. Springleaf responded to Capt. Hall's request, stating that he was not eligible for the interest rate reduction because the SCRA applies
50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527 states in pertinent part:
50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527(a)(1)(B).
50 U.S.C. Appx. § 511(3) defines "period of military service," as follows:
50 U.S.C. § 511(3) (emphasis added).
The undisputed facts establish that Capt. Hall obtained the Springleaf loan on June 23, 2013, when he was on Title 10 active duty. As quoted above, Section 527 of the SCRA requires that the debt be "incurred by a servicemember, ... before the servicemember enters military service." Capt. Hall, however, points to Section 511(3) and the following language in his ORDERS A-08-213933: "Upon completion of this duty, unless sooner released, you will return to your home and upon arrival be released from active duty." [31] at 1; [32-1] at 2. Capt. Hall then postulates that the amended orders, ORDERS A-08-213933A01, released him from active duty when he returned home on September 30, 2013, thereby resulting in two, separate periods of Title 10 military service: one from October 10, 2012 to September 30, 2013, under ORDERS A-08-213933A01, and a second from October 1, 2013 to July 6, 2014, under ORDERS 269-061.
In statutory construction cases, the court must "begin with the language of the statute." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 950, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). "The first step `is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.'" Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). "The inquiry ceases `if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.'" Id.
Applying these principles of statutory construction, the court finds no merit to Capt. Hall's argument. Capt. Hall bases his argument on Section 511(3), which plainly and unambiguously defines the end of a "period of military service" by the "date" on which the servicemember is "released from military service." Although ORDERS A-08-213933A01 released Capt. Hall from active duty under those orders on September 30, 2013, they did not release him from Title 10 military service. By September 30, 2013, ORDERS 269-061 had already been issued, and they immediately continued Capt. Hall on Title 10 service on the next date, October 1, 2013. The undisputed facts show that there was no date from October 10, 2012, to July 6, 2014, on which Capt. Hall was not on Title 10 military service, and Capt. Hall was not released from Title 10 military service until the date of July 6, 2014, the effective release date in his REFRAD order.
The court's holding also comports with the purpose behind Section 527 of the SCRA. Section 527 is intended to afford servicemembers an opportunity to reduce the interest rate on a loan, when leaving their civilian job and entering military service affects their ability to pay it. Section 527(c) makes this purpose clear, as it allows a creditor relief from the Section 527 rate reduction if the servicemember's "ability ... to pay interest upon the [loan]... at a rate in excess of 6 percent per year is not materially affected by ... the servicemember's military service." 50 U.S.C. Appx. § 527(c). This purpose would not be accomplished by applying the Section 527 reduction to Capt. Hall's June 24, 2013, loan. First, he incurred the debt during the same period of military service for which he seeks the reduction. When Capt. Hall took out the loan, he had already been on active duty for approximately
The Court has considered all of the parties' arguments. Those not specifically addressed would not have changed the out-come. For the reasons stated above, Springleaf's motion for summary judgment [13] is granted. Capt. Hall's motion for summary judgment [16] is denied, and his claims are dismissed with prejudice.
A separate final judgment will be entered in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.